To establish a firmer foundation for the definition of Truth as presented on this website, it is necessary to better understand the nature of Identity.
There are two kinds of identity. Identity of an entity with itself, and identity of two separate entities with each other.

By entity, I mean either an object that occupies space or a concept that resides in minds.

The IS of identity can relate two different entities, Personal Names or Titles.
An example of an identity that refers to a unique person is Mark Twain IS Samuel Clemens. Wherever “Mark Twain” is used, we can substitute “Samuel Clemens” and our propositions will remain valid.

An example of an identity that refers to a Title is Truth IS God.
The terms “Truth” and “God” are TITLES and which are not proper names, thus they do not reference any one person in particular. Just as “President of the US” is a Title and does not reference any one person in particular. It is only when a proper name is given that we can know which one of the many Presidents the speaker is referring to.

In Identity propositions with Names, we can know who they are referring to because a personal name refers to a unique person with unique attributes or history.

In Identity propositions with Titles, we cannot know the person that the proposition is referencing. We need to further define the Title, so that we can know who in particular it is referencing.
Thus in Truth is God, each term, each Title, must be further defined to be able to apply the Title to a specific person. The propositions must be interpreted.

Now we need to examine the Two different ways that we think of Identity:- The Identity of an entity with itself and the Identity of Two separate entities with each other.

FORMAL  IDENTITY >>> A=A
“A” IS THE SAME AS ITSELF >>> TAUTOLOGY, does not enlighten us.

MATERIAL  IDENTITY >>> A=B
“A” AND “B” ARE THE SAME >>> of value

Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing.
Ludwig Wittgenstein; (1889-1951); Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; 1922/1999; 5.5303; pg. 83

It would seem to be a necessary truth that if a=b then whatever is truly ascribable to a is truly ascribable to b and vice versa (Leibniz’s Law).
If a is b, how can a have genuine properties b hasn’t, or b have genuine properties a hasn’t?
If we had to know all about a planet in order to name or identify it we could never get started in learning anything about a planet’s history.
D. Wiggins; Identity-Statements

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